We investigate the effect of mobility on the evolution of cooperation in a flock model, where each player moves on the two-dimensional plane with the same absolute velocity. At each time step every player plays the prisoner's dilemma game and aligns moving direction with its neighbors, who are chosen according to distances in the two-dimensional space. Experimental results have shown that with unconditional cooperation or defection, cooperation can be maintained in mobile players even for high velocities, as local interactions among players are enhanced by the expansion of neighborhood. And for a fixed temptation b or absolute velocity v, there exists an optimal neighborhood size, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides the model exhibits aggregation behavior, and mobile cooperators can coexist with defectors because of asymmetric neighborhood.
Introduction
Cooperation is commonly observed in genomes, cells, multi-cellular organisms, social insects, and human society, but Darwin's Theory of Evolution implies fierce competition for existence among selfish and unrelated individuals. In past decades, many efforts have been devoted to understanding the mechanisms behind the emergence and maintenance of cooperation, in which the prisoner's dilemma game is a widely used model to illustrate the conflict between selfish and cooperative behavior in the context of evolutionary game theory.
The traditional prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a two-player game, where each player can choose either cooperation (C) or defection (D). Mutual cooperation between two players pays each a reward R, while mutual defection brings each a punishment P . If one player chooses to cooperate while the other prefers to defect, the cooperator obtains the sucker's payoff S and the defector gains the temptation T . The four payoff values satisfy the following conditions: T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T . For a selfish player, defection is the optimal strategy to maximize its own payoff in a one-shot game, no mater what the opponent dose. But according to the inequalities mentioned above, the total income of two defectors is lower than that of two cooperators. Hence the dilemma arises and obviously, defection is evolutionary stable [1] .
The spatial PD games have attracted much attention since Nowak and May reported the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in a twodimensional lattice [2] . And many works have been done focused on devising evolutionary rules, or introducing various networks to describe players' connections. For example, the noise can be introduced based on the payoff difference, which allows an inferior strategy to be followed with certain probability [3] . And the mapping of game payoffs to individual fitness can follow different distributions, which accounts for social diversity [4] . Besides, the strategy can be updated according to dynamic preferential selection [5] . In addition, the spatial structure has also been extended and very recently, there are many interests in the evolution of cooperation in complex networks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . For more details about evolutionary games on networks, see [11, 12, 13] and references therein.
Often players in spatial PD games are located on static networks and only those who are directly connected will interact with each other. However, the sizes of social networks continuously change in real world as individuals join or quit, and the topologies also evolve as links are created or broken. To capture the dynamic feature of social systems, the evolution of network structure can be coupled with game dynamics through adaptive local interactions, where individuals may adjust social ties according to their payoff [14, 15] . But structure dynamics of some networks are directly caused by the movement of individuals. For example, in mobile communication network cell phones connect with different mobile telephone base stations when people are moving. And a new job often brings one new colleagues in the acquaintance network. As pointed in [16] , the motion of individuals is an important characteristic to reproduce social network , and the patterns of human mobility have drawn much attention [17, 18] in the past years. So when the spatial structure has been introduced, the evolution of cooperation in mobile individuals should be considered.
By intuition the introduction of mobility would lead to the dominance of defection because mobile defectors can expect more cooperators to employ than that of static network, and escape retaliation of former partner by running away. Yet, the correlation between cooperation and mobility is more complex than intuition. The cost of mobility could affect the origin of altruism, while the rise of altruism cost would lead to an evolutionary reduction of mobility [19] . And with a win-stay, lose-shift rule cooperation would be evolutionary stable under generalized reciprocity [20] . Further, in agent-based models mobility of individuals can be involved explicitly as the movement of agents. For example, Aktipis reported a simple strategy of contingent movement on patches, which outperformed some complex strategies [21] . And Vainstein et al. investigated the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on the diluted lattices, where the movement of agents was Brownian, non-contingent [22] . Besides, when molecular dynamics was used to simulate the movement of individuals, cooperators in the PD game could also survive [23] .
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation, which is explicitly represented as an absolute velocity v. And in the agent-based model, the movement of agent is non-contingent, imitating the direction alignment process in biological flocks. It is found that cooperation can be maintained in mobile agents with unconditional, simple strategies. And there is an optimal number of neighbors, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides the coexistence of mobile cooperators and defectors is illustrated.
The Model
In biological systems, such as flocks of birds and schools of fish, individuals are tending to align their movement directions with that of nearby neighbors. To simulate the process of direction alignment in flocks, we consider a system that contains N = 500 self-propelled agents. At time t = 0 all agents are randomly distributed in a square-shaped cell of linear size L, and have the same absolute velocity v with different directions uniformly distributed in [0, 2π). At the next time (t ≥ 0) the position of each agent is calculated according to
where the velocity − → V i (t) of agent i contains an absolute value v and a direction given by the angle θ i (t). And the angle θ i (t) of every agent is updated as
where N i (t) denotes the neighborhood of agent i. It can be also written as
where the function argmin k {•} means to find k smallest elements given in {•} and the function • is used to calculate distances between each agent in the two-dimensional space.
Note that the model proposed in [24] defines the neighbors of agent i as agents within the circle of radius r centered at itself. But some agents may have more neighbors than that of the others. To exclude those effects coming from the fluctuations of the number of neighbors, we choose k nearest agents to agent i as its neighbors, though in spatial games the neighborhood is usually determined by the existence of links among nodes.
Next we introduce the rules of evolutionary PD game on the flock model. Initially an equal percentage of strategies are randomly distributed in the system. The strategy s i of each agent can be denoted by the unit vector (1, 0)
T , which indicates cooperation or defection. At each time step, every player plays the PD game with his neighbors defined as (3), and accumulates a payoff M i = j∈Ni s T i P s j . Following the common practices [2] , the payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma takes a rescaled form as
where 1 < b < 2. Then each player compares its income with that of his neighbors, and at the next time the player will choose the strategy that gains the highest payoff among itself and its neighbors. After updating strategies, every agent modifies its position and direction. This process is repeated until the system reaches equilibrium.
Results and Discussions
We have investigated the PD under different values of the temptation b, the absolute velocity v and the neighborhood size k. The cooperation level is characterized by the frequency of cooperators, which is defined as the percentage ratio of cooperators in the population. And in all simulations, equilibrium frequencies of cooperators are obtained by averaging over 100 generations after a transient time of 300 generations. Besides, data points in each figure are acquired by averaging over 200 realizations of independent initial states. Fig. 1 
be maintained in a relatively stable level with small fluctuations below b c , whereas defectors dominate the population above b d . These two values depend on k, and simulations show that b c decreases as the increase of k. Besides the lowest density of cooperators can be observed for k = 3, while the increase of k can enhance f c in the system for fixed values of b and v if b < b c . As we known, the increase of neighborhood on regular, static network would inhibit cooperation in the PD game [3, 6] . And our results imply that the growth of local connections can promote cooperation among mobile agents.
Dai et al. reported the promotion of cooperation through enlarging the size of neighborhood among mobile agents [23] , where molecular dynamics is used to describe repulsion and attraction between agents in flocks. As an intermediate dynamic model between regular lattice and complex network, the existence of hubs in the underlying network leads a higher cooperation level than that of ours. In our model, every individual play with the same number of neighbors and there are no hubs. But comparing with the regular lattice, the movement of individuals and the way that choosing neighbors cause asymmetric interactions among players to promote cooperation.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the number of neighbors is too small to maintain continuous interactions among nearby cooperators for k = 3, while the increase of k shrinks the range in which cooperation can be maintained. Next our attention will focused on the role of neighborhood k. Fig. 2(a) shows the dependence of f c on the size of neighborhood k under different velocities for a fixed temptation b = 1.2. As we can see, there is a maximum f c around k = 7, which shows intermediate local connections can produce optimal cooperation level even for large values of b. But the growth of v makes the decrease of maximum value of f c, and the curve of f c is almost leveled off when v = 0.2. This demonstrates the positive effect coming from intermediate local connections on cooperation is restricted when the agents move with a higher v. And Fig. 2(b) presents the dependence of f c on the size of neighborhood k for different values of the temptation b with a fixed absolute velocity v = 0.05. It can also find optimal values of k for different b to produce a maximum f c in the system. Note these four curves share common parts at initial stage, and as the increase of k, they divide into different branches.
We have also studied the effect of absolute velocity v on the cooperation level. Fig. 3 demonstrates the frequency of cooperators f c as a function of the absolute velocity v in the stationary state for different values of k with a fixed temptation b. In our model the absolute velocity v can be used to measure mobility of players. As the increase of v, the interaction range of every player is enlarged and one player can expect to interact with more neighbors than before, which means the system is approximating to the mean field situation. We can find that in Fig.3 defectors gradually dominate the population as the velocity of players, v, is increased. Note when players move with v = 0.3, there are still cooperators surviving in the system when k = 7 or k = 9 shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) . As suggested in [23] , expanding the size of neighborhood prevents each player escape from its neighbors and keeps a continuous interaction between each player and local neighborhood [22] . In other words, the drop of f c caused by the movement of players can be offset by the enlargement of interaction range k. However, we have pointed out that for a fixed v, cooperative behavior can be maintained within a certain range as long as the temptation b does not exceed the threshold b c (k). This helps to explain why in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3 Collective behavior is a fascinating property of many self-propelled agent systems. Fig. 4 illustrates the aggregation behavior of agents at the stationary state. As shown in Fig. 4(a) the system has formed many components. The direction that each component moves to is indicated by an arrow, which shows the trajectory of the component center. And the remaining three figures provide details of the corresponding parts that are labeled b, c and d respectively in Fig.  4(a) . Perhaps the most interesting case we can find is that agents in a component adopt the same strategy and runs toward the same direction.
Compared with Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) , there are still a few defectors surrounded by cooperators, or located at the border of the component in Fig. 4(d) . As mentioned above, agent i imitates the strategy that gains the highest payoff in the last round among itself and its neighbors j, where j ∈ N i . However, the neighborhood of j may be different with the neighborhood of i, i.e. N i = N j . So, as shown in Fig. 5(a) the defectors surrounded by cooperators have the highest payoff in its neighborhood, while for the cooperators neighboring the defector, 
Conclusion
To summarize, we have investigated the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation in the direction alignment process of flocks and found that cooperation can be maintained in mobile players with simple strategies. Increasing the neighborhood size k can offset the effects caused by the movement of players provided b is kept within a certain range, and for a fixed b or v, there exist an optimal number of neighbors to produce the maximum cooperation level. Moreover, the system exhibits aggregation behavior. And because of the asymmetric neighborhood, cooperator and defector can coexist in the same component. This work is supported by the National Key Fundamental Research Program (Grant No.2002cb312200) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.60575036).
